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1. Expanding the standard reading of Hegel: the educational and  
formative role of the market sphere 
Current attempts to provide a moral foundation to the market system or 
sphere find inspiration in authors like Hegel (1991), Durkheim (1958, 2014), 
Hirschman (1982) and in Karl Polanyi (1979) too. But while there is a range 
of authors who can be seen as precursors of approaches which seek to criticize 
markets mainly from a normative perspective (cf. Foucade, Healy 2007), 
some of which rely on the identification of the normative presuppositions 
lurking behind our participation in the market sphere (Honneth 2014, 
pp. 176‑252), these approaches sometimes omit the advantages the market 
structures might yield to the development of individuals and societies alike. 
In Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1991) we find an account of civil society and 
of the market sphere which makes possible not only drafting a developmental 
story of the unfolding of these two elements of our social world, but also, 
ultimately, a normative basis onto which a critique of markets can be based. 
In this paper I will discuss a recent contribution in the study of Hegel’s views 
on the market sphere which points to an unexplored argument in favour of 
the market sphere: its role as a medium which facilitates the educational and 
formative development of the members of civil society.2 
1  pedro.teixeira@fu‑berlin.de.
2  In this paper, I cite Hegel’s works by employing the abbreviations below. The 
Philosophy of Right is quoted by paragraph according to the English translation 
published as Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood and trans. H.B. 
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Before I proceed, I should introduce here two much‑needed caveats. 
First, in this paper I am not concerned with reaching a definite account of 
Hegel’s views on the market system or sphere. That is surely an important 
discussion within Hegelian scholarship, but the main purpose of this 
work is to examine the added‑value of both the standard interpretation of 
Hegel’s views on the market sphere and a new interpretation according 
to which the market system has an intrinsic educational and formative 
value for the members of civil society. The main purpose of this paper 
is to provide answers to the following two interrelated questions: does 
this broader interpretation of Hegel regarding the intrinsic value of the 
market give us a useful angle from which to understand and potentially 
criticize current market practices? And if it does, at what level may this 
new insight display its usefulness?
Second, it should be noted that Hegel’s reflections on the market sphere 
are difficult to distinguish from his wider account of civil society. I will try, 
as much as possible, not to enter too much into his complex argumentation 
about the features of civil society that enable the expansion of freedom.3 
Some of the elements which are constitutive of the sphere of civil society 
(for example, the administration of justice), while bearing a relationship to 
the system of economic production and exchange, can no longer be said to 
belong directly to the market sphere. That Hegel for the most part does not 
explicitly talk about markets likely owes as much to the fact that they were 
not yet seen as standalone objects of study as to the particular way Hegel 
progressively unfolds the coming to be of every manifestation of Reason 
in actual, existent social structures.
In any case, the standard view on Hegel’s arguments for the market 
sphere holds that, for the most part, they seem to resonate Adam Smith’s 
insights in the Wealth of Nations. Like Smith, Hegel seems to believe that 
the market economy is superior to other economic systems (PR §185A) 
due to its intrinsic capacity to allow the free expression of the desires 
of the members of society (PR §194) (cf. Wood 1990, Knowles 2002, 
Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The Wanneman notes and the 
lectures on the Philosophy of Right are quoted by page number.
• Elements of the Philosophy of Right [PR]
• Philosophie des Rechts: Die Mitschriften Wannemann (Heidelberg 1817/18) und 
Homeyer (Berlin 1818/19). [VPR1]
• Philosophie des Rechts: Die Vorlesungen von 1819/20 in einer Nachschrift. [VPR2].
3  I here side with the kind of interpretative effort presented by Neuhouser (2000), who 
undertakes an analysis of Hegel’s social theory premised on the idea that a social order 
is rational insofar as the institutions of that social order help secure and expand freedom, 
in all its different guises.
35The Educational Role of the Market Sphere
Peperzak 2001, and Herzog 2013), which in turn enables individuals to 
fulfil their particular needs in the space of difference that civil society 
represents (Neuhouser 2000, pp. 135‑136). This point is especially 
important if one interprets Hegel’s Philosophy of Right as an attempt to 
describe the specific contribution of each of the several spheres of society 
(the family, civil society and the state) to the realisation of private, moral 
and social freedoms (cf. Neuhouser 2000, p. 34). 
In addition, and again similarly to Smith, Hegel also recognises the 
capacity of the market sphere to increase overall material wealth (PR §243), 
even if it remains to be seen whether the gains from increased economic 
growth do actually ‘trickle down’. While Hegel generally subscribes 
to Smith’s outlook, he expresses the worry that the market sphere may 
contribute to the undoing of a large portion of the population by actually 
decreasing their prosperity (PR §244). For Hegel, this side‑effect of the 
market system may be compounded by the exclusion of some people from 
work, understood here as the productive activity which is both a source of 
honour and of self‑esteem for persons as workers (PR §244‑245).
But the benefits brought about by the market sphere are not limited to 
the growth in aggregate economic output. In fact, markets also encourage 
innovation by fostering and allowing the expansion and multiplication 
of goods and needs (PR §190‑191) Nevertheless, Hegel also displays 
his reservations about this ‘infinite process’ of generation of new needs 
and products. Hegel’s main concern here is that it might make market 
participants feel more miserable (PR §191-195) as they find themselves 
permanently striving for the fulfilment of newly created, artificial needs. 
Already the qualifications made by Hegel with regard to these three points 
famously presented by Adam Smith show Hegel’s concern with the negative 
effects of the market sphere. In fact, despite textual evidence pointing to a 
more nuanced picture of Hegel’s embrace of the market institution, namely 
Hegel’s arguments about the need for countervailing structures of the civil 
society (e.g. the police and corporation) to counter the worst effects of the 
market system (cf. Hegel’s comments about the rabble, PR §244), Hegel is 
still sometimes seen as a plain follower of Smith. This is true to some extent, 
but the reservations he shows highlight the inadequateness of such a loose 
view, which, one may also say, is also unfair of Adam Smith himself.4
4  Contrary to popular belief, at several points in both The Wealth of Nations (1976) and his 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (2002) Smith makes clear his non‑absolutism with regard 
to the supposed superiority of markets (cf. also Herzog 2013; Herzog, Honneth 2014, 
pp. 15‑18).
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2. The market system as a sphere of Bildung (“education”)
In a recent paper, Heisenberg (2018) extends the prevailing view of Hegel 
by claiming that it is fundamentally incomplete, as it overlooks a crucial 
advantage afforded by the market system: its educational role.5 As Hegel 
himself stresses in PR §187, civil society is the space of Bildung par excellence. 
If, then, markets constitute a fundamental part of the sphere of civil society, it 
begs the question whether they also fulfil a direct and discernible educational 
role, or whether Bildung in civil society is limited to other parts which bear no 
clear relation to the unique attributes of the market sphere.
In Heisenberg’s reading, the Hegelian defence of the market system 
is fundamentally incomplete without considering the remarks in the 
Philosophy of Right, in the Wanneman notes to the Philosophy of Right 
(1817/18 and 1818/19) and in the lectures on the Philosophy of Right 
(1819/20) which point to the vital importance of the market system as a 
space in which the members of society, in their gradual learning process 
towards becoming full members of a society of equals, learn not only to 
regard others as individuals with equal standing and endowed with equally 
relevant desires, but also to see the well‑ordered civil society as the only 
space in which they can find proper shelter and fulfilment. This argument 
can be broken down into four parts:
1. By entering the market sphere individuals learn something about their 
own desires and needs, in a way that was not possible within the ethical unit of 
the family. This in turn constitutes a liberation [Befreiung] (PR §194‑195) in 
which individuals not only “free themselves” [sich freimachen] (PR §182Z), 
that is, become free to pursue their particular desires, but also become finally 
conscious about their own desires (cf. Heisenberg 2018, p. 5);
2. By entering the market sphere and engaging in market exchanges 
with others, each individual learns that other persons have different needs 
and desires. Persons therefore develop their own “tact” [Schliff], broadly 
meaning here our general capacity to behave properly in the social world, 
as they learn about the interests and needs of others (PR §187Z, VPR1, 
259). This in turn helps all participants realize that our modern society 
5  It is always worthwhile recalling that the German concept Bildung loses some of 
its special significance when translated into the English word “education”. To our 
modern ears “education” mostly means learning new skills or acquiring some sort of 
knowledge and therefore does not necessarily refer to a process of character and personal 
development which brings us to maturity and which also plays a role in the formation 
of free citizens (see Neuhouser 2000, p. 31). In this paper I will use the words Bildung 
and “education” somewhat interchangeably, in order not to distract the reader by the 
permanent use of the German noun.
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is characterized by a certain level of diversity against a background of 
homogeneity (VPR2, 157);
3. Once they enter the market sphere individuals come to terms not 
only with the differences between market participants (as shown in step 2 
above) but also with their equality as mere human beings with desires and 
needs (PR §209A). As such, we come to see the universal determinations 
of others qua human beings, as opposed to the particular determinations 
as specific individuals.6 The market therefore enables the learning both of 
difference – individuals will exhibit a wide variety of interests and desires 
– and of equality, which may seem paradoxical. We thus learn something 
about our social world.7
4. Finally, because the market resembles a “state of nature”, by 
participating in the market we get a glimpse of what it would be to live 
in such a state of war of all against all. The disaggregation brought about 
by markets, which is necessary for persons to actively pursue their desires 
and fulfil their needs via acts of exchange, suggests the situation of a ‘state 
of nature’ while never actually constituting one. The visible effects of 
market interactions, which include the unbridled pursuit of self‑interest as 
well as the rise of inequality, poverty and the creation of artificial needs, 
inadvertently “teaches” us that only collective institutions can bring back 
some of the lost ethical unity.
Although there is much to profit from a renewed understanding of 
Hegel’s arguments about the advantages of the market system, the current 
state of development of market structures makes a focus on the formative 
gains afforded by the market system as an additional source of justification 
for our reconciliation with the market economy [alongside the enablement 
of individual particular desires or expansion of overall economic output 
(cf. Smith 2002, David Ricardo 2015)] particularly incomplete as a solid 
ground for a contemporary critique of the market system. In the following 
section I will highlight several reasons why we should be particularly wary 
of applying this kind of project to the highly complex and differentiated 
economic systems of our time. 
6  The expression of particular determinations includes membership of a social group: 
“I am apprehended as a universal person, in which respect all are identical. A human 
being counts as such because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, 
Protestant, German, Italian, etc.” (PR §209A).
7  The learning process outlined in step 3 of Heisenberg’s reconstruction suggests a 
“civilising” effect of the market sphere, in the sense that it helps us realise the universal 
needs shared by all human beings alike. Cf. Hirschman’s doux-commerce thesis – the 
“civilising” effect of the expansion of markets (Hirschman 1982).
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3. Limitations of the educational role of markets
In the roughly two hundred years which have gone by since Hegel 
delineated his account of the sphere of civil society we have witnessed how 
quickly and steadily markets have changed over time. But while it should be 
evident to any contemporary observer that today’s markets exhibit certain 
features which would have been unfathomable for any thinker of Hegel’s 
time, namely the ones directly caused by technological innovations, it is 
also true that some of the key aspects of the market sphere also remained 
unaffected. Indeed, the central act which takes place within this sphere 
involves some kind of exchange of goods between sellers and buyers, and 
the overwhelming majority of these exchanges are performed by using 
money (or capital) as a medium. Moreover, although the technological 
and informational apparatus which underlies the functioning of the market 
system greatly changed, many of these transactions are still small‑scale or 
geographically local, much like they were in Hegel’s time. 
Despite the preservation of some of its central features, today’s 
market sphere also significantly departs from the one Hegel observed in 
his time. First, many acts of exchange in today’s wide market sphere can 
hardly be said to allow some educational development or growth for the 
market participants themselves. This may be due to the combination of 
ever‑increasing economies of scale and technological developments, which 
mean that today the sellers’ part of the transaction is carried out mostly 
either 1) by wage‑dependent workers whose direct engagement with the 
buyer arguably does not enable the kind of reciprocal learning Hegel seems 
to have had in mind, or 2) via technological interfaces which have effaced 
the presence of humanity on the other side of the transaction. 
Second, it is also unclear whether steps 2 and 3 of Heisenberg’s 
reconstruction apply to the current stage of development of the market 
sphere. The models which may have inspired Hegel when structuring 
his argumentation may have been that of the town market, in which 
buyers often buy directly from the artisan or local producer, and that of 
the national economy, which although constituting a proper system of 
fulfilment of needs nevertheless cannot account for the globalised scope of 
market interactions. How, for example, can we make sense of the large and 
opaque financial markets or of the complex global chains of production 
and logistics? 
Third, it is unclear whether step 4 in the process of Bildung should 
be seen as a moment of learning or just a mere reaction to the limitations 
of any mode of social organization (or disorganization). In other words: 
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how can one attach an educational value to the market system, thereby 
rehearsing a justification of its existence and providing some motivation 
for our reconciliation with it, by noticing how deeply destructive it might 
become if left unattended? Additionally, does that mean that markets 
should be maintained in order for us to finally understand the personal and 
social ills they ultimately cause, and to come to terms with the necessity 
of erecting a well‑ordered, stable society? The worry here is that one is 
attributing an intrinsic value worth to a sphere, in the present discussion 
the market sphere, by reconciling oneself with its worst features. The 
alternative response to this somewhat paradoxical take would consist in 
acknowledging that the educational worth of markets does not have to 
translate into the reconciliation with their actual existence: the formative 
value of the market sphere would then be confined to history books, in 
which one could see that the market sphere provided a stepping stone 
towards better, more perfect systems of fulfilment of needs.
But perhaps the Hegelian insights into the market system can be 
combined with some elements of the early Marxist critique of capitalism, 
as well as with Polanyi’s notion of the disembedding of markets, for a 
renewed critique of the varieties of market system as they exist today. At 
first glance, Marx’s diagnosis of the several kinds of alienation caused by 
capitalist markets (cf. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx 
1978, pp. 72‑81) seems difficult to reconcile with the supposed educational 
value of markets. If anything, what we learn from entering the market 
sphere is that formal equality with others is either meaningless, because 
it does not convert into real material equality or equal economic power, 
or plainly ideological, because it serves to justify and legitimize a deeply 
unequal system of needs. Of course, from a Marxist perspective the idea 
that the capitalist system constitutes a “system of needs”, as Hegel puts it, 
is highly debatable if not plainly wrong. More than satisfying needs, an 
economic system in which capital accumulation and the profit motive play 
such a central role in setting up the rules of motion of the entire economic 
system is more properly characterised as a “system of capital”. 
Furthermore, because participation in the capitalist economic system 
is for both workers and capitalists8 a source of alienation [Entfremdung], 
the idea that participating in capitalist markets could engender some form 
of personal and social Bildung could only sound plausible if the learning 
8  To be fully consistent, from Marx’s own standpoint one should also hold the view that 
the capitalist himself is also adversely affected by the process of alienation spurred 
by the capitalist mode of production of exchange, although to a lesser extent than the 
wage‑labourer (Marx 1978, p. 72‑81).
40 Pedro A. Teixeira
outcome consisted in the awakening of the alienated social classes and in 
the call for a struggle against the market system itself. Notwithstanding the 
limitations of the Hegelian analysis of the economic sphere, these corrections 
to Hegel’s point of view need not be converted into a downright rejection 
of the idea that markets carry a certain educational potential with them. As 
I will discuss below, one viable way forward would to be to investigate 
which possible learning outcomes are enabled by current market systems, 
once we treat them both as systems of needs and of capital9 and in addition 
account for the abovementioned processes of alienation.
Even if Hegel’s account of the market sphere lacks some crucial 
elements, its strongly holistic bent might be regarded as problematic. At 
this juncture, however, I would argue that the work of Karl Polanyi may 
prove useful to unravel this complication. Like Hegel, Polanyi does not see 
markets as constituting autonomous, ‘free‑standing’ systems of interaction 
between agents. Although Polanyi’s account of the market sphere is not 
subordinated to a holistic description of the several spheres which enable the 
actualisation of freedom, it is clear that for Polanyi markets should be seen 
as integral parts of the wider ethical whole of the community. But unlike 
Hegel, Polanyi’s narrower view consists in claiming that economic systems 
in general and market systems in particular exist insofar as they reflect 
wider relationships of reciprocity, functional necessity and commonality. 
Under this perspective, markets are embedded in the ethical relationships 
of a community (cf. Polanyi 2001). However, after a certain point in their 
path towards becoming first national and then global markets, they start 
corrupting the social fabric of communities, which is underpinned by the 
notions of sharing and reciprocity (cf. Polanyi 1979). From a Polanyian 
perspective, the educational role of markets could prove essential for the 
members of a given community to learn that the acts of market exchange, 
when taken beyond a certain level and without consideration of the 
shared ethical relationships of a community, may threaten the life of the 
community itself. 
4. Keeping the educational impact of the market system  
within our purview
In light of our attempt to preserve the possibility of an educational 
impact of markets on our development as persons and citizens, a possible 
normative foundation of the market system could consist in requiring 
9  There is no immediate contradiction in ascribing both traits to today’s market systems, 
as far as I can see.
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any market structure to fulfil an educational role. From this perspective, 
market systems and structures could no longer be justified merely by 
recalling the stupendous development of material wealth, but would have 
to show how they fit into a wider purpose, namely by contributing to the 
formation of emancipated free and equal citizens. Markets would have 
to permanently display their educational worth. But this formative value 
of markets could not be reduced, as Smith and more recently Friedman 
(1981) did, to learning that the market economy blindly and mysteriously 
combines multiple skills and talents into the production of complex 
goods, but to the realisation that markets are but a stage in the formation 
of an intermediate, and therefore insufficient, notion of equality between 
human beings. However, as we have discussed in the previous section, 
this project of a normative critique of the market system based on its 
educational shortcomings is perhaps only persuasive if we endorse the 
Hegelian analysis of the market system, both in his characterization of 
its essential features and of its advantages and drawbacks.
If, on the contrary, we are persuaded by the glaring inadequateness of 
Hegel’s economic analysis10 and seek to expand it by adding the elements 
we sketched at the end of section 3, we are then led to the vicinity of 
discussions in political economy which deal with the problem of finding 
the right locus for the pursuit of feasible and desirable economic policy. If, 
following the discussion so far, we are to bring the educational and formative 
value of the market to the fore, then we should look at the levels where this 
role could be fulfilled: on the one hand, the local, small-scale markets,11 
which could be said to maintain the type of reciprocal interaction which 
lies at the bottom of Hegel’s analysis; and, on the other hand, the economic 
space of the nation‑state. In the wake of debates concerning the unfolding 
of the 2008 financial crisis, namely its effects on the economies of some 
European countries,12 critics of the neo‑liberal framework of the Eurozone 
have often stressed that the nation‑state remains the only place where a 
certain fit between democratic integration, economic self-determination and 
reciprocal economic exchange subsists (Streeck 2012). Given that Bildung 
in Hegel may be said to be instrumental in the generation of fully‑abled 
citizens ready to enjoy the several types of freedom envisioned in Hegel’s 
10  Cf. Priddat (1990).
11 Cf. Erik Olin Wright’s reflections on the economic alternatives within capitalism 
(Wright 2013).
12  The Eurozone is composed of countries which share the Euro as a common currency 
and which therefore surrendered some instruments of political economy to the Eurozone 
as a whole.
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Philosophy of Right, it is worthwhile considering furnishing current 
attempts to ground a return to the democratic control of the economy 
with an account of the educational and formative impact of the market 
system. Our almost exclusive focus on controlling the market forces is 
perhaps but a sign of our lack of critical engagement with it and of our 
inability to learn something from it.
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ABSTRACT
Hegel is sometimes regarded as a defender of the market system. Recently, 
Heisenberg (2018) argued that the prevailing view of Hegel is incomplete, as 
it overlooks a fundamental advantage of the market: its educational role. In his 
reading, the Hegelian defence of the market system includes seeing the market 
as the sphere where persons learn both to regard others as individuals with equal 
standing and equally relevant desires and to see the well‑ordered civil society as the 
space where all social members can find protection and fulfil their needs. I argue 
that this focus, while inadequate as a sole ground for a critique of today’s market 
systems, can potentially bring forward new normative critiques of the market. 
These in turn require departing from Hegel’s baseline assumptions regarding the 
market sphere and applying this analysis to the locus where the educational impact 
of markets arguably subsists: the local or national levels.
Keywords: Hegel – Bildung – Education – Markets – Value of Markets
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RESUMO
Hegel é por vezes tido como um apologista dos mercados. Recentemente, 
Heisenberg argumentou que a interpretação mais comum da posição de Hegel 
é, ainda, incompleta, pois ignora uma vantagem fundamental dos mercados: o 
seu papel educacional. Segundo esta leitura, a defesa hegeliana do sistema de 
mercado inclui conceber o mercado enquanto esfera na qual as pessoas aprendem 
tanto a encarar os outros enquanto iguais como também enquanto indivíduos 
detentores de desejos igualmente relevantes. Na esfera do mercado, as pessoas 
aprendem também a ver na sociedade civil bem ordenada o espaço no qual todos 
os membros da sociedade encontram protecção adequada e satisfazem as suas 
necessidades. Neste artigo, argumento que este foco, embora por si só incapaz de 
fornecer um ponto de partida para a crítica dos sistemas de mercado actuais, pode 
contudo permitir uma nova crítica normativa dos mercados. Para tal, no entanto, 
é necessário rejeitar algumas das premissas iniciais de Hegel em relação à esfera 
do mercado, bem como aplicar este tipo de análise ao locus no qual o impacto 
educacional dos mercados ainda se pode observar: nos níveis local e nacional. 
Palavras-chave: Hegel – Bildung – Educação – Mercados – Valor dos Mercados
